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“[D]ynamic models of multiparty competition, especially when vot-
ers care about a diverse set of issues, are analytically intractable.”
(Laver and Sergenti 2012, 5)
With different points of reference, ‘analytical intractability’ is a very common
argument for the usage of computer simulations in the social sciences. But in
contrast to many authors, the elaborations by Michael Laver and Ernest Ser-
genti are theoretically profound. The point of ‘analytical intractability’ is not
used to directly justify agent-based simulations, but to assume that party lead-
ers must rely on informal decision heuristics in order to ﬁnd a policy program
that attracts as many voters as possible. However, while the main points are cor-
rect, some details of their argumentation are rather vague. One objective of this
review is to smooth the authors’ justiﬁcation for the usage of decision heuris-
tics. A second objective is to brieﬂy outline the work as an excellent example of
simulation-based research.
First, it must be clariﬁed, what Laver and Sergenti mean by ‘analytically
intractable’. There is no formal deﬁnition of this term. Instead, the authors re-
fer to ‘computational intractability’, a concept from computer science. Without
going into much detail, a problem is categorized as computationally intractable
if nobody has yet found an algorithm that can calculate a solution to this prob-
lem in polynomial time. This means that, if the problem is solvable at all, the
time required for calculation increases exponentially with the size of the input
data (e.g. the number of actors involved or the number of nodes in a graph). For
some instances, the calculations may take years and the researcher (or politi-
cian) might run out of budget, or the results might become irrelevant in the
meantime.
The book is about one of these computationally intractable problems. It is
about party competition and, in particular, about modeling the dynamics in
policy decisions that are made by party leaders in order to increase their vote
shares. In contrast to another recent book about party competition and elec-
tion theory (Bendor et al. 2011), Laver and Sergenti are not concerned with theBook Review: Party Competition. An Agent-Based Model 67
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Figure 1: Voronoi Regions of policy space
voters’ behavior. Instead, the policy preferences of the electorate are regarded
as ﬁxed and modeled by a frequency distribution over a two-dimensional pol-
icy space. Each dimension bundles a set of preferences that correlate with each
other, e.g. the economic left-right dimension with ‘right’ standing among other
things for minimal state intervention in the economy.
In the model of Laver and Sergenti, multiple parties align their programs
along the two policy dimensions, and each voter’s support is assigned to the
party that is the closest in regard to policy preferences. As the authors point
out, this division of the policy space correlates to a Voronoi diagram, which is
a special form of partitioning a metric space where each partition is associated
with a generating point. Figure 1 shows an example of a Voronoi diagram in
policy space (generated with data from Benoit and Laver 2006). The generating
points represent political parties and the Voronoi regions, which are the parts
of the policy space that are closer to the corresponding generating point than to
any other one, constitute the parties’ vote shares.
For simpliﬁcations, we can assume a lattice graph with a ﬁnite number of
nodes instead of the continuous policy space (ﬁgure 1). Each vertex is weighted
by the proportion of voters, whose political preferences correspond to the posi-
tion of the vertex in the graph. Each party marks a single vertex as its policy
program and receives the votes of the surrounding Voronoi region. Assuming
that party leaders try to maximize their support by choosing a program that at-
tracts a majority of the voters, the leaders’ decisions can be modeled as a Voronoi
game on graphs with n nodes and k parties.
Given that k¡1 parties have already chosen their policy program, the kth
party can optimize its choice by considering every unoccupied node of the graph
and by calculating the corresponding Voronoi region. Obviously, the larger n,
the more time is needed to ﬁnd an optimal place in the policy space. But the68 Johannes Zschache
time that is required to calculate the best solution increases only as a polyno-
mial function of n. Hence, it is not computationally intractable to compute a
best response given the k¡1 positions of all other parties. Nevertheless, it is,
indeed, intractable to decide the existence of a Nash Equilibrium of a Voronoi
game on a general graph (Dürr and Thang 2007). As a consequence, it is compu-
tationally intractable to ﬁnd an optimal move in the policy space assuming that
the other parties behave similarly (common knowledge of rationality). Addition-
ally, the Voronoi games as implemented by the authors are not strictly discrete.
The voters are indeed embedded in a (discrete) grid structure. But the parties
move along a continuous space above the grid. There are only few studies about
Voronoi games on the continuous domain, and they are either restricted to one
dimension or to the one-round game (e.g. Ahn et al. 2004). But the general ac-
cord is the intractability of ﬁnding an optimal move.
In sum, ﬁnding an optimal policy move is not guaranteed or at least very
time- and resource-consuming in a dynamic party competition game with at
least three parties and two policy dimensions. Because no real politician is likely
to ﬁnd a best strategy in reasonable time, the authors assume that party lead-
ers use informal decision heuristics: “These are decision-making rules-of-thumb
which can in practice be very effective but can never be proven formally to be
best responses to any conceivable state of the world.” (Laver and Sergenti 2012,
44) The authors further assume that different politicians use different heuris-
tics. However, the assumption of heuristics do not require agent-based simula-
tions as a tool for theoretical research. It is rather a convenient alternative and
saves time and energy that are needed to look for or research analytical methods
that can deal with the given task.
The decision heuristics are arbitrarily chosen by the authors and justiﬁed as
plausible and as frequently occurring in real-life politics. For example, Sticker
describes a party that never changes its policy program and sticks with its ini-
tial ideal point. An Aggregator tries to optimally represent the policy prefer-
ences of its current voters. This rule stands for real parties that employ internal
polling processes to identify the party members’ ideal points. Additionally, the
authors include a number of vote-seeking parties, such as the Hunter and the
Explorer. These parties continuously change their policy program in order to
increase their vote shares by every move.
The main part of the book deals with the different decision rules when con-
fronted with a range of parameter settings of the competitive environment. A
number of techniques of simulation-based research are employed. The decision
rules are investigated by themselves and in competition with each other. The
authors also develop an evolutionary process in form of a replicator-mutator dy-
namic: parties ‘die’ if they cannot uphold a certain threshold of party supporters,
and new parties are ‘born’ in places of the policy space that are currently under-
represented. In a paper that is not included in the book, Fowler and Laver (2008)
even arrange a computer tournament of party decision rules.
While there is no rule that outperforms the other ones in any setting, there
are several lessons that can be learned from the simulations. For instance, ifBook Review: Party Competition. An Agent-Based Model 69
all parties use the Aggregator rule, the policy preferences of the electorate will
be optimally represented. But generally, an Aggregator performs poorly in com-
petition with vote-seeking rules. In contrast, while it is beneﬁcial to look for
policy positions with higher vote shares, insatiable vote-seeking party leaders
“are systematically outperformed by satiable leaders” (Laver and Sergenti 2012,
156). Furthermore, the success of a rule depends on the underlying assump-
tions about the distribution of the voters’ policy preferences. Some decision rules
thrive in homogeneous societies but loose some of their superiority in societies
that are segregated in two groups with fairly different preferences.
A last chapter of this book attempts to confront the results from the simu-
lations with empirical data. Because of the lack of data for many parameters
that have been introduced to the model, the authors are not able to test most of
the hypotheses that have been derived from the simulations. Instead, they ﬁx
some of the input parameters to plausible values, and calibrate the remaining
parameters to values that yields the best ﬁt of the model to the data. For cali-
bration, the authors use expert surveys that estimate the policy movements of
political parties from ten different European countries between 1989 and 2002.
Subsequently and assuming the validity of their model of party competition,
Laver and Sergenti state which kind of decision rule is most likely to have been
used by party leaders during this time. The empirical validation of these con-
jectures is offered only in forms of anecdotes and empirical observations. While
this chapter is probably the most fragile one of the book, it is still an important
step to approach the point where the implications of the simulation model can
actually be tested empirically.
Besides political scientists who are interested in the topic, this book is well
suited for any social scientist who looks for an exemplary introduction to ba-
sic techniques of simulation-based research. But also researchers who already
use simulations might proﬁt from reading chapter two, which was discussed
above, and chapter four. The latter contains an insightful tutorial to the usage
of Markov chain analysis to draw general conclusions from the output data. The
authors are very aware of the limits of simulations, for the results only hold for
the parameter range that have been used as input values. In order to obtain a
similar scope and precision as analytical models, they apply systematic sweeps,
Monte Carlo parameterization, and statistical methods to interpolate for input
values that have not been tested. By doing this, the authors hope to set “new
standards of intellectual rigor for specifying and exercising [agent-based models]
in a manner analogous to classical analysis” (Laver and Sergenti 2012, xii).
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